ABC, PETITION OF AGAINST THE PRINCIPAL REPORTER AND OTHERS [2018] ScotCS CSOH

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	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> ABC, PETITION OF AGAINST THE PRINCIPAL REPORTER AND OTHERS [2018] ScotCS CSOH_81 (31 July 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2018/[2018]_CSOH_81.html Cite as: [2018] CSOH 81, [2018] ScotCS CSOH_81, 2018 GWD 28-353, 2019 SCLR 190, 2018 Fam LR 106, 2018 SLT 1100

[1] This case involves a challenge to two decisions of a Children’s Hearing on the basis

that the petitioner, ABC, who is the full sibling of DEF, the child about whom decisions were

taken at those hearings, was not able to participate or at least fully participate in them,

notwithstanding his established family life with his sibling. The petitioner, whose identity has

been protected through anonymisation, including, unusually, in the petition itself, was born in

October 2003. The first respondent is the Principal Reporter whose office, The Scottish

Children’s Reporter Administration (“SCRA”) provides administration and a number of other

duties in respect of the Children’s Hearing. The third respondent is the Lord Advocate. The

first interested party is East Lothian Council, the implementation authority in terms of a

compulsory supervision order (“CSO”) in respect of ABC’s sibling DEF. The second interested

party is the father of both ABC and DEF. The third interested party is the mother of both ABC

and DEF. For convenience I will use the masculine personal pronoun “he” when referring to

both ABC and DEF, although Counsel took care to preserve anonymity to the extent of not

[2] DEF was born in October 2010 and is accordingly seven years younger than his full

sibling ABC. The two children lived together with their parents (and their other siblings) until

14 June 2016 when they were both accommodated with foster carers in terms of measures

included in CSOs made by the Children’s Hearing in respect of each of them. They were

accommodated with different foster carers. ABC was returned to the care of his parents on

26 July 2017. He challenges decisions made by the Children’s Hearing on 7 September 2017 and

5 December 2017 which made certain provisions in relation to the restriction of his contact with

DEF. The challenges he makes require consideration of the relevant provisions of the

Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (“the 2011 Act”) and their compatibility or otherwise

with the procedural requirements of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights

[3] The current legislation in this jurisdiction providing a statutory scheme for the operation

of the Children’s Hearing system is the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (“the 2011 Act”).

Subordinate legislation provides the relevant procedural rules, currently the Children’s Hearings

(Scotland) Act 2011 (Rules of Procedure in Children’s Hearings) Rules 2013/194 (“the

2013 Rules”) made under and in terms of section 177 of the 2011 Act. The provisions of the

2011 Act and relative rules with which this case is primarily concerned relate to those that make

provision for the definition of “relevant person”, that is someone who can attend and participate

fully in the Children’s Hearing. In the predecessor legislation, Part 2 of the Children (Scotland)

Act 1995, the term “relevant person” was also used. However the definition under the 2011 Act

is different. In addition, there is a new mechanism for determination of whether to deem a

person a relevant person for the purposes of participation in the Children’s Hearing. The

provisions of the 2011 Act germane to this petition are in the following terms:

“79 Referral of certain matters for pre-hearing determination(1) [Subsections

(2) to (5) apply] where a children's hearing is to be held in relation to a child by

(1A) Subsection (5A) applies (in addition to subsections (2) to (5)) where the

(b) held for the purposes of reviewing a compulsory supervision order.

(a) must refer the matter of whether a particular individual should be

deemed to be a relevant person in relation to the child for determination

by three members of the Children's Panel selected by the National

(b) may refer that matter for determination by a pre-hearing panel on the

(ii) following a request to the Principal Reporter from the child, a

relevant person in relation to the child, or if a safeguarder has

(a) whether the child should be excused from attending the children's

(b) whether a relevant person in relation to the child should be excused

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(a), the pre-hearing panel may excuse the

(a) the pre-hearing panel is satisfied that any of paragraphs (a) to (c) of

(5) For the purposes of subsection (3)(b), the pre-hearing panel may excuse a

relevant person in relation to the child from attending the children's hearing

(a) the pre-hearing panel is satisfied that section 74(3)(a) or (b) applies, or

(b) the relevant person may be excused under rules under section 177.

(a) must refer the matter of whether an individual deemed to be a relevant

person by virtue of section 81 should continue to be deemed to be a

relevant person in relation to the child for determination by a pre-

(b) may refer that matter for determination by a pre-hearing panel on the

(6) A member of the Children's Panel selected for a pre-hearing panel may (but

(1) This section applies where the Principal Reporter refers a matter to a pre-

(2) The Principal Reporter must arrange a meeting of the pre-hearing panel for a

(3) If it is not practicable for the Principal Reporter to comply with subsection (2),

the children's hearing must determine the matter referred at the beginning of

81 Determination of claim that person be deemed a relevant person

(1) This section applies where a matter mentioned in section 79(2)(a) (a ‘relevant

person claim’) is referred to a meeting of a pre-hearing panel.

(2) Where the relevant person claim is referred along with any other matter, the

pre-hearing panel must [unless that other matter is a matter mentioned in

section 79(5A)(a)] determine the relevant person claim before determining the

(3) The pre-hearing panel must deem the individual to be a relevant person if it

considers that the individual has (or has recently had) a significant involvement

(4) Where the pre-hearing panel deems the individual to be a relevant person, the

individual is to be treated as a relevant person for the purposes of Parts 7 to 15,

(d) any compulsory supervision order, interim compulsory supervision

order, medical examination order, or warrant to secure attendance

(ii) the sheriff in any court proceedings falling within paragraph (f),

(e) any children's hearing held for the purposes of reviewing a compulsory

(f) any court proceedings held in connection with a hearing mentioned in

(g) any court proceedings held in connection with an order or warrant

(h) the implementation of an order or warrant falling within paragraph (d).

(7) Where, by virtue of section 80(3), the children's hearing is to determine the

relevant person claim, references in subsections (2) to (4) (other than paragraph

(b) the order contains (or is varied so as to contain) a measure of the type

mentioned in section 83(2)(g) or 87(2)(e) (‘a contact direction’).

(2) The Principal Reporter must arrange a children’s hearing for the purposes of

(b) if requested to do so by an individual who claims that the conditions

specified for the purposes of this paragraph in an order made by the

(a) a contact order regulating contact between an individual (other than a

(b) a permanence order which specifies arrangements for contact between

(1) In this Act, ‘relevant person’, in relation to a child, means—

(a) a parent or guardian having parental responsibilities or parental rights

(b) a person in whom parental responsibilities or parental rights are vested

(d) a parent having parental responsibility for the child under Part 1 of the

(e) a person having parental responsibility for the child by virtue of—

(iii) section 25(3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (c.38),

(f) a person in whom parental responsibilities or parental rights are vested

by virtue of a permanence order (as defined in section 80(2) of the

(g) any other person specified by order made by the Scottish Ministers.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), a parent does not have parental

responsibilities or rights merely by virtue of an order under section 11(2)(d) or

The specific definition of relevant person for the purposes of section 21 reviews of contact is

contained in The Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (Review of contact directions and

definition of relevant person) Order 2013 (2013 no 193), article 2 of which is in the following

(1) The condition set out in paragraph (2) is specified for the purposes of

section 126(2)(b) of the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (review of

(2) The condition is that the individual, who is not a relevant person in relation to

the child, has or recently has had a significant involvement in the upbringing of

(3) In this article ‘relevant person’ includes a person who is to be treated as the

child’s relevant person by virtue of a decision under section 81(3), 160(4)(b) or

The condition is identical to that in (Rule 81(3)(a) of SSI 2013/194) the test in section 81(3) of the

[4] The pertinent parts of the 2013 Rules in relation to notification of Children’s Hearings

22.(1) Where a children’s hearing is to be held in relation to a child by virtue of section

69(2) (determination under section 66: referral to children’s hearing) or Parts 9 to

11 (children’s hearing; proceedings before sheriff; subsequent children’s

hearings) or 13 (review of compulsory supervision order) of the Act the Reporter

must notify the persons mentioned in paragraph (2) of the date, time and place of

the children’s hearing, as soon as practicable and no later than 7 days before the

to have or recently have had significant involvement in the upbringing of

(e) the chief social work officer of the relevant local authority for the child;

Other information to be given with notification of a children’s hearing to the child

23. The Reporter must when issuing the notice under rule 22(1) to the child and each

relevant person also give to the child and each relevant person—

(a) information on the availability to the child and relevant person of legal

(b) confirmation of the child’s duty to attend the children’s hearing under

section 73 (child’s duty to attend children’s hearing) of the Act;

hearing under section 74 (relevant person’s duty to attend children’s

(d) confirmation of the right of the child and each relevant person to request

a pre-hearing panel or children’s hearing to determine whether—

(i) a particular individual should be deemed to be a relevant person;

(ii) the child or relevant person should be excused from all or part of

(iii) it is likely that the children’s hearing will consider making a

(e) information on the means by which the child may express views to the

(f) confirmation of the right of the child and each relevant person to give any

report or other document for the consideration of the children’s hearing

Other information to be given with notification of a children’s hearing to certain

Where rule 22 applies, when issuing the notification required under that rule the

Reporter must also give to any individual other than a relevant person who

appears to the Reporter to have or recently have had significant involvement in

the upbringing of the child the information mentioned in paragraph (2).

(2) That information is confirmation of the right of the individual to require a pre-

hearing panel or a children’s hearing to determine whether the individual should

(2) Where this rule applies and a children’s hearing is to be held in relation to a child

the Reporter must notify the persons mentioned in paragraph (3) that a

children’s hearing is to be held in relation to a child, on the date to be specified in

the notification, and, when issuing that notification, also give those persons the

(a) any individual other than a relevant person who appears to the Reporter

to have or recently have had significant involvement in the upbringing of

(b) any individual who has a contact order regulating contact between the

[5] There was no suggestion at the hearing before me that the matters raised by the

petitioner could not be determined by reference to the undisputed facts and legal argument.

As already indicated, the petitioner lived in family with his parents, the second and third

interested parties, and the child DEF until June 2016. They have been part of the same family

unit for their whole lives other than where there has been state intervention in the form of care

proceedings initiated by the Reporter to the Children’s Panel. It was not ultimately disputed

that the petitioner has established family life with DEF in terms of article 8 ECHR although this

was not conceded by the third respondent prior to the commencement of the hearing before me.

After the petitioner and DEF were accommodated by the local authority they continued to have

contact. One of the issues before the Children’s Hearing in the second half of 2017 was the

[6] Turning to the two specific decisions of the Children’s Hearing under challenge, the first

of these was a decision of 7 September 2017. On that date the Children’s Hearing continued a

compulsory supervision order (“CSO”) in respect of the child DEF. Two of the measures

included in the CSO were continued directions regulating contact between DEF and, amongst

others, the petitioner. Those directions were continued from a previous CSO made on 25 April

2017 when both children had been accommodated but with different foster carers. The first

relevant direction specified that contact between DEF and ABC would be for a minimum of

once per fortnight for a minimum of two hours. The second direction restricted indirect contact

between DEF and the petitioner by prohibiting telephone contact between them (and between

DEF and his parents). It is not in dispute that ABC was not notified of the Children’s Hearing

held on 7 September 2017. He was not invited to attend that hearing or provided with any

papers that were to be considered on that date. He was not asked to provide his views to the

Children’s Hearing. As it happens the petitioner did attend the hearing of 7 September 2017

briefly as he was present in the building in which the hearing was being held. However he was

not permitted to take part in the hearing and was asked to leave. He was not informed of the

decision of the Children’s Hearing held on that date or provided with written confirmation of

that decision or the reasons for it. While the record of proceedings of the Children’s Hearing of

7 September 2017 suggests that the majority decision of the hearing was that contact between

DEF and ABC should be supervised, that aspect of the decision was not then recorded on the

CSO. ABC attempted to lodge an appeal against the decision of the Children’s Hearing of

7 September 2017 in terms of section 154 of the 2011 Act. The Principal Reporter contended

that the appeal was incompetent as being both outside the time allowed for an appeal and also

because ABC did not fall within the categories of person who could competently appeal. It was

conceded on behalf of ABC that the appeal was incompetent. Following the Children’s Hearing

of 7 September 2017 contact between DEF and ABC was supervised by or on behalf of the first

[7] The Principal Reporter arranged for a further Children’s Hearing to take place on

5 December 2017 to review of DEF’s CSO and in relation to the contact directions, including

between DEF and ABC. On 3 November 2017 solicitors instructed by ABC wrote to the

Reporter (the letter is no 6/6 of process) raising the issue of ABC’s participation in the Children’s

Hearing. The Reporter responded by letter of 9 November 2017 (no 6/7 of process) indicating

an intention to invite ABC to the Children’s Hearing and confirming that it would be for the

chair of that hearing to decide whether ABC would be allowed to attend and for how long.

ABC was invited to produce written information that he wanted to be considered at the

Children’s Hearing. ABC provided such written information by letter of 27 November 2017.

On 5 December 2017 the Children’s Hearing continued the CSO in respect of DEF and varied

the directions regulating contact between the siblings. In particular it was specified that DEF

would have unsupervised contact with his siblings (including ABC) for a minimum of once per

fortnight for a minimum of two hours and that DEF would have no unsupervised telephone

contact with either his parents or his siblings (including ABC). ABC was not provided with

papers or other information that were to be before the Children’s Hearing on 5 December 2017.

He was permitted to attend the hearing and was accompanied by his solicitor. ABC and his

representative were told of the decision of the Children’s Hearing at its conclusion, although

they were not provided with written confirmation or reasons for the decision.

[8] At no stage has the Principal Reporter referred ABC to a pre-hearing panel in the

exercise of his discretion in terms of section 79 of the 2011 Act. ABC has not applied to be

deemed a relevant person in terms of section 81 of the 2011 Act. Accordingly, in relation to the

Children’s Hearings in September and December 2017, ABC was not treated as a relevant

person, with all the rights and obligations that flow from that status.

[9] Senior counsel for the petitioner contended that the decision making process in

September and December 2017 did not provide the requisite article 8 protection for ABC

standing his lack of involvement in the September hearing and the limited involvement

permitted at the time of the December hearing. She contended that the interference with ABC’s

established family life with DEF was accordingly unlawful. As neither of the principal

respondents contended that ABC did not have established family life with DEF in terms of

article 8 ECHR at the relevant time, one of the main issues became that of the extent if any, to

which different degrees of relationship attracted different substantive rights. The petitioner’s

position was that, standing ABC’s established family life, the decisions of the Children’s

Hearing, which by definition could interfere with that family life, without ABC’s participation,

[10] Ms Brabender contended that both ABC and DEF have the right to respect for their

family life in terms of article 8(1) ECHR. That right was not restricted to the maintenance of a

reasonable relationship. While the issue of sibling contact was one about which the Children’s

Hearing could make decisions, the broader decisions made by the Children’s Hearing engaged

both ABC and DEF’s right to respect for family life. As family life between the siblings was

established, the starting point could not be some watered down version of ABC’s rights under

[11] On the question of whether the decisions of the Children’s Hearings of 7 September 2017

and 5 December 2017 interfered with ABC’s right to respect for family life, senior counsel

contended that they did so interfere. Considerable reliance was placed on the UK Supreme

Court’s consideration of this issue in the case of Principal Reporter v K 2011 SC(UK) SC 91.

There, Lord Hope and Lady Hale had confirmed, under reference to Johansen v Norway

[1997] 23 EHRR 33 and L v Finland [1994] 18 EHRR 342, that any court order which regulates or

restricts the “mutual enjoyment of each other’s company” which “constitutes a fundamental

element of family life” will amount to an interference with that family life. The decision of a

Children’s Hearing was specifically included as one that would constitute an interference with

the family life of a child and (in the context of that case) the parent with whom he or she lives

and also with the family life of the child and the other parent. Any order that there was to be no

contact between parent and child would manifestly interfere with family life. (Principal Reporter

[12] More importantly from the petitioner’s perspective in this case, the UK Supreme Court

in Principal Reporter v K emphasised also the positive procedural obligations inherent in the

right to respect for family life. Under reference to the decision in W v UK [1998] 10 EHRR 29 the

court confirmed (at paragraph 41) that parents must be enabled to play a proper part in the

decision making process before the authorities may interfere in their family life with their

children. Ms Brabender submitted that those requirements were equally applicable to someone

in ABC’s position. As decisions of the Children’s Hearing could restrict or limit his enjoyment

of family life with DEF those decisions were capable of interfering with his right to respect for

family life. The positive procedural obligations in respect of the Children’s Hearing process

amounted to a requirement that ABC be involved in the decision making process to a degree

sufficient to provide him with the requisite protection of his interest. If that involvement is not

ensured, it would amount to a failure to respect ABC’s family life and so the interference with it

would not be capable of being regarded as necessary in terms of article 8(2) ECHR. As every

review of a compulsory supervision order includes a review of all measures relating to a child

including a decision on whether compulsory supervision is needed at all, there is a separate

interference with family life on each occasion of such a review. Ms Brabender accepted that a

simple review of a contact direction is more limited but pointed out that the September and

December Children’s Hearings were not restricted to the issue of contact but were global

reviews. The stage at which ABC’s right to respect for family life required protection was not

simply when the decision to accommodate his sibling was taken. In terms of the structure of

the 2011 Act, a CSO has a maximum lifespan of 12 months, a period that had expired by the

time the review hearings of September and December 2017 took place.

[13] In anticipation of counsel for the third respondent relying on a distinction between the

article 8 rights of parents and those of grandparents or siblings, senior counsel contended that

siblings such as ABC were a central part of the core family unit and so could be distinguished

from grandparents, uncles and aunts and other wider family who might not have lived with the

child about whom the Children’s Hearing will take decisions. That limitations were imposed

on ABC’s enjoyment of family life with DEF could not be disputed. There were three particular

restrictions or limitations on that family life on 7 September 2017, namely the continuation of a

CSO accommodating DEF away from home, the imposition of a limitation of direct contact in

terms of frequency and duration and the prohibition of any indirect contact (such as by

telephone) against a background of the limitation of physical contact. Insofar as it might be

suggested that the decisions on contact were supportive of the maintenance of a relationship

between siblings rather than a limitation, counsel submitted that such an argument could go to

justification but could not answer the question of whether there was interference with family

life. Undoubtedly there would be circumstances where it was justifiable to interfere with the

established family life of siblings on welfare grounds but the issue raised in these proceedings

was the level of involvement of the party (ABC) in the process in which such limitation was said

to be justified. The issue was whether ABC’s involvement, such as it was, in September and

December 2017, was sufficient to protect his interest and make the interference lawful. The

merits of the decisions taken by the Children’s Hearing were not at issue, only the positive

procedural obligation as outlined by the Supreme Court in Principal Reporter v K. While the

focus in that case was on parental relationships, the ratio could be easily read across to include

siblings. In particular, at paragraph 43 of the decision in Principal Reporter v K, reference is

made to there being insufficient procedural safeguards where “the family were not sufficiently

involved in the decision making process”. Limitations on sibling contact were just as

fundamental, insofar as the effect on children are concerned, as a parent’s contact with his or

[14] Ms Brabender acknowledged that in Principal Reporter v K the Supreme Court had been

concerned with the interpretation of the previous statutory scheme for Children’s Hearings in

terms of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 and in particular the effective participation of the

unmarried father. It was noteworthy, however, that when the case had been argued before the

Supreme Court it was known that the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 was being

promulgated. Against that background and notwithstanding that the case involved only an

unmarried father with no parental responsibilities and rights, the UK Supreme Court

specifically included others in its conclusion, which was stated in the following terms:

“In conclusion, therefore, a parent (or other person) whose family life with the child is at

risk in the proceedings must be afforded a proper opportunity to take part in the

decision making process. As currently constituted the Children’s Hearing system

violated the art 8 rights of this father (and indeed of his child) and risks violating the

The court went further in specifically addressing the situation of those who are not parents in

considering how the previous legislation might be read down. The judgment specifically notes

(at paragraph 68) that persons other than parents may have article 8 procedural rights which

require to be protected. While noting that if all that is at risk is informal contact with the wider

family the participation of each parent and the child will in most cases afford adequate

“…there are cases in which the child’s hope of reintegration in her natural family

depends upon maintaining the close relationship established with a grandparent or

other family members. There would then be a procedural obligation to involve that

[15] It was on that basis that the court considered that the potential for violation could be

cured by inserting the words “or who appears to have established family life with the child

with which the decision of a Children’s Hearing may interfere” into section 93(2)(b) of the

1995 Act. That subsection had already been read down in the case of Authority Reporter v S 2010

SC 531 to include any parent enjoying a right of contact under part 1 of the 1995 Act.

[16] Senior counsel pointed out that ensuring effective participation in the Children’s

Hearing had been an issue for many years. In McMichael v UK [1995] 20 EHRR 205 it was held

that the parents of a child had not been afforded effective participation in a Children’s Hearing

concerning their child where they had not been provided with copies of the report available to

the hearing. In anticipation that counsel for the third respondent would rely heavily on the case

of Boyle v UK (App No 16580/90) (9 February 1993) senior counsel noted that, despite that case

being of considerable age, the actual finding was that an uncle who had spent only some

weekends with the child in question and who was not then allowed to participate in care

proceedings in England had suffered a breach of his article 8 rights. Accordingly even if ABC’s

relationship with DEF was to be categorised only as a meaningful relationship, it was still likely

that his article 8 rights had been interfered with. The failure to tell ABC about the Children’s

Hearing in September 2017 or to provide him with paperwork or an opportunity to participate

were all illustrative of a lack of effective participation. Further, without any locus in terms of

the legislation ABC had been unable to present a competent appeal against that decision. While

it was accepted that ABC had been informed of the December hearing and allowed to attend

with his legal representative, the arguments about a lack of paperwork or an opportunity to

review or appeal remained pertinent for that hearing also. There were considerable analogies

with the position of the natural father in the case of McMichael v United Kingdom. Both

Mr McMichael and ABC had an established family life but no right to appear in the Children’s

Hearing. This led to a breach at least of the procedural obligations of article 8.

[17] Against the background of the undisputed facts of the case and in the absence of any

decision on permanence in relation to DEF, Ms Brabender submitted that the Children’s

Hearing had been required to consider at each review hearing whether a necessary measure

was to require that DEF be accommodated away from home. That put the decision squarely

within the category referred to in paragraph 68 of Principal Reporter v K where there was a

procedural obligation to involve any relative with whom the child may or may not be

re-integrated a decision on which depended upon maintaining the close relationship between

them. Only by including ABC as a relevant person could those procedural requirements have

been fulfilled. Accordingly, the mechanism by which someone could be deemed to be a

[18] The petitioner’s submission was that the statutory and procedural mechanism by which

a person may be deemed to be a relevant person could not and did not afford ABC the requisite

protection of his interests. Rule 22 of the 2013 Rules requires the Reporter to notify certain

persons of the date, time and place of the Children’s Hearing. Those persons include the child,

each relevant person, any appointed safeguarder, the chief social work officer, the National

Convener and, most relevantly in relation to this case “any individual other than a relevant

person who appears to the Reporter to have or recently have had significant involvement in the

upbringing of the child”. The terms of Rules 23 and 24 of the 2013 Rules were also significant

because, had the Reporter considered that ABC could fall within the category of having had

significant involvement in the upbringing of DEF, he would have required to give notification

of the matters specified in those rules to him. It was acknowledged that section 126 of the

2011 Act provides for reviews only of contact directions and limited circumstances. However if

the Reporter had categorised the hearing of 7 September as such a review, he would have had

to notify ABC of that hearing in terms of Rule 81 of the 2013 Rules. Rule 81 provides for the

notification in advance of a Children’s Hearing to persons who have a right of contact in terms

of a contact order or a permanence order of that person’s right to attend a Children’s Hearing.

It was apparent from the undisputed facts that the Reporter had not notified ABC of the

[19] The introduction of a pre-hearing panel system to determine certain issues including

whether to deem a person a relevant person for the purposes of participation in the Children’s

Hearing arguably provides a route for those such as ABC to seek to be included in that manner.

However, Ms Brabender contended that as section 79(2) of the 2011 Act gave the Reporter a

discretion to refer to a pre-hearing panel the question of whether ABC should be deemed a

relevant person and had not done so, the starting point was that s/he had clearly not considered

that ABC could fall within the definition of someone who had or recently had a significant

involvement in DEF’s upbringing. Although section 79(2)(a) requires the Reporter to refer the

issue of whether someone is a relevant person to a pre-hearing panel if requested to do so by an

individual such as ABC, where ABC did not know in advance that the September 2017 hearing

was taking place, he would not have been able to make such a request. In any event, even in

relation to the December hearing of which notification had been given, ABC could not,

according to senior counsel, have satisfied the test of “a significant involvement in the

upbringing” of DEF because of the connotation of having had a parental role that the term

“upbringing” requires. The ordinary meaning of the test introduced in the 2011 Act restricted

those who can be included as relevant persons to those who had fulfilled some sort of parental

or educative function and not someone who had enjoyed the established family life of a sibling

by being part of the core family of the child in question. Ms Brabender submitted that it had

been incumbent upon the Scottish Parliament to make the 2011 Act article 8 compliant and that

could easily have been done by incorporating the words read into the previous legislation by

the UK Supreme Court. Having introduced a new and very different wording into the

legislation, someone such as ABC, who would have fallen within the definition of relevant

person under the previous legislation as read down by the Supreme Court, could not bring

himself within the new provision. The test of “significant involvement in the upbringing of the

child” was an invention of the parliamentary draftsman and was much narrower than the

[20] Ms Brabender submitted that section 81 of the 2011 Act could not be read down to

include anyone with established family life with which the decisions of the Children’s Hearing

may interfere as to do so would “go against the grain” of the legislation. While coincidently a

sibling might have some involvement in the upbringing of another child in the family the

determining factor in the current test was that it was necessary to be acting in a parental role in

order to be a relevant person. Accordingly ABC could not bring himself within the terms of

significant involvement in upbringing in section 81(3). A further difficulty for him was that the

Principal Reporter remains the gatekeeper for the route to the Children’s Hearing in terms of

the 2011 Act. In order to ask for a pre-hearing panel to deem him a relevant person ABC would

have to know of the hearing. It was not in dispute that he did not know of the September

hearing. So far as the December hearing was concerned the letter 6/6 of process from ABC’s

solicitors to the Reporter’s administration notes that ABC’s representatives have information

about the forthcoming hearing on 5 December and records that in the solicitor’s view section 81

is not the appropriate procedure for ABC to seek to attend and so asks how the Principal

Reporter intends to ensure that his rights are protected. The Reporter’s response (number 6/7 of

process) was that ABC would be invited to attend on 5 December but whether he would be

allowed to participate would be at the discretion of the Children’s Hearing. While it was likely

that the Reporter would suggest that the legislation could be read down if necessary, senior

counsel for the petitioner pointed out that ABC had no opportunity at all to seek to attend the

September hearing; that the Reporter did not inform him of any right he may have nor was any

pre-hearing panel arranged on the basis that it seemed to the Reporter that ABC fell within the

[21] It was anticipated that counsel representing the Reporter would seek to rely on

section 126 of the 2011 Act as an alternative mechanism through which ABC could participate.

Section 126 (reproduced in part in paragraph 2 hereof) provides for reviews of contact decisions

in limited circumstances. The Reporter must arrange a Children’s Hearing for the purposes of

reviewing the contact direction in those circumstances, which include if he is requested to do so

by an individual who is not a relevant person but who claims that he or she has (or recently has

had) a significant involvement in the upbringing of the child. That condition is the one

specified in Rule 81(3)(a) of the 2013 Rules. Quite apart from the obvious point that section 126

involves the same test of significant involvement in the upbringing of the child complained of,

the Reporter should not be permitted to rely on the alternative mechanism in section 126 where,

as gatekeeper, the Reporter had not sought to invoke that mechanism. It was questionable

whether section 126 was apposite as a provision for those with an interest only in maintaining

contact standing the use of the same test of significant involvement in the upbringing of a child

which would permit those with contact to become relevant persons if they could fulfil it. The

Reporter should not be permitted to contend that ABC should have invoked section 81 or that

section 126 was applicable standing that the Reporter considered that those provisions did not

[22] Turning to the particular circumstances of the December 2017 hearing, Ms Brabender

submitted that the petitioner’s article 8 rights were not sufficiently protected through the steps

taken by the Reporter. ABC was not issued with papers, had no right of appeal or review of the

decision of the Children’s Hearing and had a restricted ability to contribute there. The Reporter

was likely to contend that ABC had been able to hear and respond to the positions of others but

that was not possible where he had not been able to read and respond to reports, particularly

that of the implementation authority, a report which he has still not been able to access. The

fact that ABC’s parents had a right of appeal did not resolve matters. Unless it was suggested

that they could have appealed on the basis that ABC’s article 8 rights had not been complied

with, something which would be of dubious competency, it was not clear how this could

[23] For the reasons already given it was submitted that the Act could not be read in such a

way as to be ECHR compliant. Parliament had chosen to create a situation where only people

with significant involvement in the upbringing of a child could participate in the Children’s

Hearing. That was clearly incompatible with article 8 ECHR. If it was suggested that a sibling

could go to the Sheriff Court to secure a contact order and then seek to invoke section 126 of the

2011 Act in order to participate in limited circumstances that would not resolve matters. In any

event section 126 included the same definition as that for a relevant person. It was noteworthy

that the note of argument for the third respondent had not mentioned compatibility or reading

down. So far as damages were concerned Ms Brabender relied on Medway Council v M & T

[2015] EWFC B164 at paragraph 90. She submitted that the sum sought by the petitioner was, in

light of the nature of the breach, necessary to afford ABC just satisfaction.

[24] For the Principal Reporter, senior counsel Mr Dunlop moved that his first to fourth pleas

should be sustained and the petition dismissed. He conceded at the outset that ABC had

established family life with DEF with which the decisions of the Children’s Hearing could

interfere. He gave two separate reasons why the petition should fail. First ABC had failed to

resort to alternative remedies available to him in terms of the legislation and secondly his

article 8 rights were adequately protected in this case looking at the procedure as a whole. In

general terms the 2011 Act will represent the appropriate balance between the right of the

subject child and the right of any relative in the vast majority of cases. For good reason the

legislation did not impose rights and obligations on siblings generally. For example the

obligations on a relevant person can include criminal sanctions for non-attendance. It was

generally appropriate for a relevant person to be restricted to those fulfilling a quasi-parental

role. The current petition was really about cases “at the margins”. For such relatively unusual

cases the appropriate way is for the individual to make an application to a pre-hearing panel

not to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this court. The petition was inept standing that

[25] On the interpretation of section 81(3) of the 2011 Act, it was noteworthy that, while the

panel must deem a person to be a relevant person if they have had significant involvement in

the child’s upbringing, the ability to seek to participate the Children’s Hearing was not

restricted to that. In any event the expression “significant involvement in the upbringing”,

while not defined in the Act, was elastic enough to be capable of being adapted to

circumstances akin to those of ABC, especially read with section 3 of the Human Rights

Act 1998. It was noteworthy that the concept was of involvement in upbringing not

responsibility for upbringing. Involvement was a broader concept than responsibility and

although in nearly all cases the involvement would be in a parental sense it did no violation to

the language of the statute to include a close sibling in an appropriate case. Conversely, a

chaotic situation would be introduced if every single sibling was held to be within the

definition in the legislation. While any such person could apply to be a relevant person it

should not be automatic. In order to succeed, the petitioner had to be able to contend that he

could never be able to bring himself within the definition. As the words were capable of

[26] Reference was made to the Inner House decision in the case of CF v MF & GF 2011

Fam LR 83 at paragraphs 54 and 55. Lord Malcolm had there observed, in the context of

grandparents seeking to be deemed as relevant persons for the purpose of attendance at the

Children’s Hearing, that if there is a valid case under article 8 ECHR, one would expect the

statutory test for relevant person status in the 2011 Act to be met and vice versa. In other words

the test in the 2011 Act broadly coincides with the inclusion of all those with established family

life under article 8. Further, Lord Malcolm had emphasised that the statutory test, while using

open ended phrases such as “significant” and “recently” left room for a spectrum of reasonable

and thus justifiable decisions. The case represented recent Inner House authority on the test in

the 2011 Act and supported the elastic nature of the test proposed on behalf of the Reporter. If

ABC had a valid case under article 8 the expectation would be that the statutory test would be

met. Following Principal Reporter v K a person seeking to be deemed as a relevant person had to

be someone whose rights would be interfered with but for the procedural protections of

article 8. Reference was made also to the case of MT v Gerry 2015 SC 359 in which an Extra

Division had considered the definition of relevant person in the 2011 Act. The ratio of that case

is that section 81(3) of the Act is directed towards conferring standing at the Children’s Hearing,

a question that did not involve the welfare of the child test. The issue was whether a person has

had an involvement in the upbringing of the child of such significance as to give rise to a

relationship calling for the procedural protection of constituting the individual as a party to the

proceedings with all the procedural obligations and rights which that status entails

(paragraph 14). However the court went on to look at the adjective “significant” and indicated

that because it lacks precision it requires to be construed purposively. Under reference to

Principal Reporter v K, the court had there reiterated that it was not every involvement in the life

[27] Another Inner House decision looking at section 81(3) of the 2011 Act was the Stated Case

by AR [2015] XA110/15 in which a step-grandmother sought to challenge the decision of a

sheriff at Glasgow refusing her appeal against the decision of a pre-hearing panel that she was

not a “relevant person”. Referring back to MT v Gerry the court found that the sheriff had

erred, but Mr Dunlop sought to draw attention to obiter dicta, consistent with what the later case

of CF v MF and GF cautioned, namely that as a matter of fact, if a party meets the statutory test

in section 81(3) he or she will almost certainly have article 8 rights and vice versa, albeit that

these are two separate matters (paragraph 11). Taking these three decisions together,

Mr Dunlop submitted that it was clear that if there was any dispute about whether someone

was a relevant person and fulfilled or could fulfil the statutory test, the place to test that was at

a pre-hearing panel. That tribunal was required to act compatibly with ECHR and its decisions

are subject to comprehensive rights of appeal. In the present case it was accepted that the

position of ABC was considered by the Reporter who felt that he did not meet the requirements

of the relevant person test. However that initial view did not bind anyone and ABC could still

have applied under section 81 or even section 126 in order to participate. Although it was

conceded that ABC and DEF had an established family life with each other, they had been

separated since June 2016 and the steps taken by the Reporter to involve ABC to some extent in

DEF’s hearings were sufficient. It was submitted that the proceedings had to be looked at “as a

whole” and when that was done sufficient protection to ABC’s rights had been afforded. The

fact that the Reporter was still not convinced that ABC was a relevant person did not alter his

ability to insist on a pre-hearing panel. An example of a sibling having been ultimately held to

fall within the definition of relevant person could be found in V v Locality Reporter 2013 Fam

LR 69. That case proceeded under the previous legislation but the question in these

proceedings was whether the 2011 Act is capable of being read to include a sibling who requires

procedural protection and Mr Dunlop submitted that that question should be answered in the

[28] The Reporter may not have full information about every sibling in a family and so it

would be unworkable to hold a pre-hearing panel for every sibling. It was noteworthy that

40 years of Strasbourg jurisprudence had nothing to say about the requirement to involve

siblings in care proceedings. Only in exceptional cases would a child’s sibling need or want to

be regarded as a relevant person. If all siblings who had lived with the subject child were to be

included that would run counter to the legitimate interest, noted in Principal Reporter v K, in

restricting the number of those participating in the Children’s Hearing. The sense of the

legislation was that relevant persons are all those stipulated in the Act and anyone else who

comes forward or is identified by the Principal Reporter as having had the necessary degree of

involvement with the child. In recognising that those without parental authority may have less

involvement with a child, the legislation reflects a balance between the need to comply with

article 8 ECHR and the undesirability of having those with lesser involvement as full

participants. The procedural aspects of article 8 ECHR are complied with because of the right to

review matters and appeal decisions of the pre-hearing panel. Only if ABC can satisfy the test

set out in Principal Reporter v K and show that the current regime is not affording him the

necessary procedural protections can he argue that there is a breach of the convention. The

legislation can be properly construed without any reading down. However, the Reporter’s

secondary position was that, if the court considered that ABC could not bring himself within

the definition of the 2011 Act as it currently stands, the words “or persons whose established

family life with the child may be interfered with by the hearing and whose rights require the

procedural protection of being a relevant person” could be read in. It was submitted that a

reading down of that type would not innovate on legislation any more than the cases of

authority Reporter v S or Principal Reporter v K and would not go against the grain of the

legislation. The 2011 Act was seeking to achieve convention compliance and the Scottish

Parliament could not have intended to legislate in a manner contradictory to the UK Supreme

Court’s decision in Principal Reporter v K. Accordingly, if inadvertently, not all situations were

covered by the legislation without reading down, that could be done.

[29] In relation to Ms Brabender’s arguments about section 126, Mr Dunlop submitted that it

was entirely understandable that the legislation would provide for a less all-encompassing role

in the Children’s Hearing process for those who are not relevant persons. This would normally

involve someone whose ability to interact with the child may be affected by the decisions of the

Children’s Hearing but who does not seek to have the full rights and obligations of a relevant

person. In any event it was clear that ABC could have made an application under section 81,

regardless of the prospects of success of that application and so while the alternative route of

section 126 was easily available for someone in ABC’s position it was not one he needed to

pursue. The difference between the two types of application was simply the level of

involvement in the Children’s Hearing process that would result. It was accepted that the test

of significant involvement in the upbringing of the child applied to both where someone did not

have a court contact order. However, the regime of the 2011 Act read in light of the Human

Rights Act 1998 required a coherent mirroring of article 8 rights and the definition of

“significant involvement in the upbringing of the child”. Further, because there were obvious

differences between the statutory purposes of section 81 and section 126, if the court was

minded to read down section 81(3) that could be done without having to read down section 126

and, as indicated, without going against the grain of the legislation.

[30] On the issue of ABC’s particular situation, the Reporter’s position was that while his

involvement was more than the category of “informal contact with the wider family” it was not,

on the other hand in the “hope of re-integration” category described in Principal Reporter v K. In

a recent Strasbourg judgment in the case of ML v Norway (7 September 2017, application

number 43701/14) the court had referred back to the general principles set out in K & T v Finland

and YC v United Kingdom [2012] 55 EHRR 33 to reiterate that the question is whether, having

regard to the particular circumstances of the case and the serious nature of the decisions to be

taken, the person has been involved in the decision making process, seen as whole, to a degree

sufficient to provide them or him with the requisite protection of their interest and have been

able fully to present their case. It was submitted that the 2011 Act strikes the appropriate

balance between respecting the rights of a child such as ABC and avoiding interference with

other rights, including those of the child DEF. The need to restrict the number of participants at

the Children’s Hearing should not be under estimated. Every relevant person is obliged to

participate fully and to see all documentation. There were circumstances in which that could

involve exposure to distressing information. In the present case, notwithstanding the view

taken by the Reporter in relation to whether ABC fulfilled the “significant involvement in

upbringing” test a procedure had been adopted to invite him to the hearing and have him

represented by his solicitor and make written representations. He and his solicitor had been

present throughout the December hearing and had been able to take part. The main complaint

in relation to the December hearing seemed to be a lack of documentation and senior counsel

for ABC had relied on the case of McMichael v UK. However each case was fact sensitive and it

could not be said that in every case someone in ABC’s position should be in the process and

automatically receive all documents. The court could not make a determination on whether full

access was necessary in this particular case and so could not conclude that ABC should have

been in the Children’s Hearing as a relevant person. So far as the September 2017 hearing was

concerned the Reporter’s position was that ABC had been present but not represented and the

chair of the hearing considered that the action of the mother was distressing ABC and so asked

him to leave. Looking at the procedure overall the Reporter had afforded ABC an objective and

meaningful review of his claim for contact with DEF. In those circumstances the proceedings as

a whole were article 8 compliant. It was consistent with Principal Reporter v K that the steps

necessary to protect someone’s article 8 rights will differ according to their age, the nature of

their relationship with the subject child and other factors. The situation was more nuanced than

was contended for the petitioner. For the petitioner’s argument to succeed, the Reporter would

have to consider each and every sibling in a family and write to each every time there was a

review of the issue. This would involve numerous formal letters from the Reporter to the

administration to children who might find that intimidating or distressing. There was also a

concern that it could cut across the need for privacy of the proceedings as it was important to

keep the subject child’s circumstances as confidential as possible.

[31] When asked whether he accepted on behalf of the Reporter that the definition of

relevant person was narrower in the 2011 Act than it was under the 1995 Act as read down by

the Inner House in Authority Reporter v S and the Supreme Court in Principal Reporter v K

Mr Dunlop responded that he did not. He submitted that if the current test is read in light of

section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Lord Malcolm’s view in CF, MF & GF the provision

could be read as if it said “established family life with which decisions of the children may

interfere” even though the legislation did not include those words. The chronology of events in

this case should be noted. Proceedings were first initiated in 2015 and a CSO had been in place

from June 2016. ABC had secured legal representation from as early as February 2016 from

child law experts, albeit in connection with his own CSO in the first instance. Prior to June 2016

ABC was living with his parents who were legally represented and fully aware of what was

going on. It was not unreasonable to think his parents would keep him involved. In any event

the section 79-81 process could have been invoked by his parents who were both relevant

persons. The Strasbourg jurisprudence was consistent with the proposition that different

natures of relationship require different levels of participation (Boyle v United Kingdom). It was

possible to have meaningful participation without full relevant person status as illustrated by

section 126 of the 2011 Act. In any event ABC’s parents might be expected to act in his best

interests including by taking an appeal. It was not being suggested that ABC’s appeal would

run in the parents’ name as guardians but as relevant persons they had a locus to complain on

his behalf. It could not be said that ABC’s parents had no interest in ensuring that his article 8

rights were complied with. The situation that had evolved with ABC, namely to invite him to

attend and participate in the Children’s Hearing in December 2017 but not be included as a

relevant person was more appropriate than what the petitioner sought. In short, nothing had

been done that handicapped ABC in any way. The petition was unfounded and no question of

incompatibility arose, which failing any concern could be resolved by a reading down. Even if

there was a difficulty with the legislation, there had been no breach by the Reporter and so no

damages could be secured against the first respondent. No issue was taken on the quantum of

[32] For the third respondent Ms Dunlop QC moved that the third respondent’s pleas in law

should be upheld and the petition dismissed. She clarified that the third respondent had no

position on the Reporter’s submissions about the petitioner’s failure to exhaust remedies. So far

as the article 8 ECHR arguments were concerned she endorsed what was said by Mr Dunlop for

the Reporter on that issue and presented further arguments. Ms Dunlop clarified that the

Lord Advocate now conceded that the petitioner in this case has established family life

protected by article 8. However, it was not accepted on behalf of the third respondent that any

interference with the petitioner’s article 8 rights had been identified. Taking the child DEF into

care interfered with the rights of the parents and affected a number of family relationships, but

it did not follow that each suffered interference with their article 8 rights. The actual breach

alleged by the petitioner was that by restricting contact between him and his sibling the

Children’s Hearing interfered with his article 8 rights. As a matter of fact that was not what had

occurred as the Children’s Hearing had made provision for contact at a minimum frequency for

a minimum period of time. The third respondent’s esto position was that if there had been

interference with ABC’s article 8 rights such interference was justified by article 8(2) and the

need to protect the rights and freedoms of DEF. The process had given adequate protection to

ABC’s interests. Ms Dunlop submitted that in attempting to establish a breach of his rights

under article 8, the petitioner had relied on a construct from a case analysis, but when one

looked at what the Children’s Hearing in fact decided it could be seen that there was no breach

[33] In K & T v Finland 36 EHRR 18, a grand chamber decision of the Strasbourg Court, it was

confirmed (at paragraph 151) that contact between parent and child constitutes a fundamental

element of family life and domestic measures that hinder contact amount to an interference

with the right protected by article 8 ECHR. Such interference is only a violation, however, if it

is not necessary in a democratic society in terms of article 8(2). Further it was for the national

authorities to strike a fair balance between the best interests of the child and the rights of the

parents when access was being considered (paragraph 194). Ms Dunlop referred also to the

decisions in YC v United Kingdom [2012] and ML v Norway [2017] which Mr Dunlop had cited.

On the issue of locus standi she referred to Haase v Germany [2008] 46 EHRR 242. The court had

there confirmed (at page 257) that parents in conflict with the authorities can represent their

children where the concern is that those children’s article 8 rights may be breached. Counsel

accepted, however, that in a situation where the child has his own representative a distinction

may be drawn. Considerable reliance was placed on the case of Boyle v UK [1993] application

number 16580/90. It was acknowledged that this was a decision only of the European

Commission of Human Rights and that the case had subsequently settled. It had a bearing,

however, on difference in treatment where relationships were collateral or horizontal. The

applicant in that case contended that he had enjoyed a very close relationship with the child, his

nephew, and stated that he was a “father figure” to the boy. Although he had never lived

together in family with him, the Commission expressed the view that cohabitation was not a

prerequisite for the maintenance of family ties which are to fall within the scope of the concept

of family life (paragraph 43). The decision confirms that when a parent is denied access to a

minor child taken into care there is in general interference with the parents’ right to respect for

family life as protected by article 8. This is not necessarily the case however where other close

relatives are concerned and the Commission stated that access by relatives was normally at the

discretion of a child’s parents and that where a care order has been made in respect of the child

the control of access passes to the local authority subject to there being a reasonable opportunity

to maintain the relationship (paragraph 46). In the Boyle case it was the termination of access

between uncle and nephew that led to the Commission finding a breach of article 8.

[34] Senior counsel for the third respondent made several propositions arising from the

European jurisprudence. First, the best interests of the child are of crucial importance.

Secondly, in the interests of the child refusal or restriction of access may be required. Thirdly,

in a question concerning procedure the issue will be whether the person seeking access has been

involved to a degree sufficient to protect their substantive interests. Fourthly, a wide margin of

appreciation is accorded to the domestic authorities in relation to a decision to take a child into

care, with stricter scrutiny called for regarding, in particular, restrictions on parental rights of

access. Fifthly, the domestic authorities required to strike a fair balance between the interests of

the child and those of the parents with the possibility that the interests of the child may override

those of the parents. Finally, there were very few cases addressing the rights of relatives in

collateral relationships with children in the care of public authorities with Boyle v United

Kingdom being the sole example identified. While it was important that stricter scrutiny was

required where there were access restrictions, these were generally taken to be restrictions on a

parents’ right of access. Ms Dunlop reiterated that in the present case the two decisions under

challenge had in fact regulated contact between ABC and DEF and had conferred a right to a

minimum amount of contact. She disputed the petitioner’s position that the hearing had

restricted contact. As DEF resides at an undisclosed address specifying a minimum period of

contact could not be regarded as a restriction as there was no other way of facilitating contact

without the intervention of the Children’s Hearing. So far as the third respondent was

concerned the starting point should be the formulation in Boyle v United Kingdom, namely that

the substantive right is to have a reasonable opportunity to maintain the relationship. It was the

decision to accommodate DEF in June 2016 that had diminished the contact between ABC and

DEF rather than the decisions concerning contact which the hearing has subsequently taken.

The inevitable reduction in the frequency of contact between the siblings stemmed from a valid

decision about DEF’s care taken by the body statutorily entrusted with that role. There had in

fact been contact directions in place between DEF and his siblings since 2016. The level of

contact with ABC had not changed from a minimum of two hours per fortnight since September

2016. The hearing of 5 December 2017 had served to increase the availability of unsupervised

contact. ABC had been allowed to make representations in accordance with section 78(2) of the

2011 Act and Rule 60 of the 2013 Rules all as outlined by senior counsel for the Reporter. The

contact arrangements involved balancing all respective interests, beginning with those of the

[35] It was not suggested that the participation of ABC’s parents in the Children’s Hearing

was sufficient to meet the article 8 procedural requirements. However where the parents were

fully supportive of the sibling’s contact claim there was a congruence between their interests

and his, not a conflict. The absence of conflict was relevant in considering the extent of the

procedural requirements necessary to protect ABC’s interests. His parents were in a position to

make submissions on contact before the Children’s Hearing which in turn took decisions on

contact in DEF’s interests as they were bound to do. Reference was made to the Children’s

Hearing decision of 5 December 2017 and the details of the contact decision made. Ms Dunlop

submitted that the lens through which sibling contact was approached was the primacy of best

[36] Responding specifically to the submissions that had been made by senior counsel for the

petitioner, it was said that permeating the argument for the petitioner had been the implication

that Parliament should have adopted the wording for relevant person set out in Principal

Reporter v K. Chronologically, the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Bill had been introduced in

February 2010 and was passed in November 2010 just before the decision in Principal Reporter v

K in December of that year. In any event there was no simple read across that could be done.

Parliament had decided on a new provision for relevant persons and separate possibilities for

contact directions only. It was submitted that the learning from the Principal Reporter v K case

was diffused through the legislation as it now stands. It was too simplistic to suggest that

because the UK Supreme Court’s wording was not brought in to the 2011 Act the legislation

was not ECHR compliant. One had to look at the whole scheme as it now is. Further, the

petitioner’s position was that the group of people with established family life with which the

decisions of the Children’s Hearing may interfere is coextensive with the group of people

entitled to relevant person status. However, the group of people who have established family

life which would not be interfered with would then be quite small, all others being entitled to

relevant person status. It was noteworthy that in the Strasbourg decisions the number of people

with article 8 rights is very wide and includes not just those with actual kinship but also

cohabitants and wider family. It was clear that not all could be given identical procedural

rights. The picture could be viewed as one of concentric circles with the child in the middle. To

be in the first ring it was necessary to have established family life. Ms Dunlop submitted that

when the UK Supreme Court had referred to “core family unit” at paragraph 38 of Principal

Reporter v K the reference was to parents and their children and not to the collateral relationship

of sibling to sibling. The right to be heard could have different features and the rights and

interests of other interested parties were also relevant. For example in the present case the third

interested party had raised a point about not sharing documents with ABC. Accordingly, there

were many elements to weigh in the balance to keep the numbers at the Children’s Hearing

[37] Under the current scheme parents have what Ms Dunlop described as the “leading

status” which could be granted to others on satisfaction of a factual test. Those who are parents

enjoy stipulated rights and responsibilities under the legislation and that status is extended to

people fulfilling that function on a de facto basis. In cases of state intervention where the state

becomes involved in the raising of the child the parents’ position is inevitably compromised.

The noble aspiration enunciated in Principal Reporter v K of “enlisting the family” might be

over-optimistic in cases of this sort. Attention was drawn again to the Inner House decision in

CF v MF & GF 2017 Fam LR 83 and in particular to the opinion of Lord Drummond Young in

that case at paragraph 4 where his Lordship stated that the primary function of a relevant

person was essentially procedural and that provided an important check on intervention by

public authorities in the life of a child. Typically that check would be performed by members of

a child’s family with a view to preserving the family connection and to monitor the

involvement of public authorities. Ms Dunlop submitted that this was an acknowledgement

that people “wear more than one hat” in the life of a child. Only the relevant person is an

essential participant but others may have something to offer. It is more difficult to see it as

necessary for a sibling to perform the roles described by Lord Drummond Young unless they

had played a caring or “raising the child” role in which case they would fall easily within the

[38] When asked whether the 2011 Act definition of relevant person was narrower than the

1995 Act as read down by the UK Supreme Court, the position for the third respondent differed

slightly from that of the Principal Reporter. Ms Dunlop would not be drawn into accepting that

the definition was narrower but conceded that it was certainly a different test. She suggested

that the use of the indefinite article “a” prior to the words “significant involvement” provided

for a greater number of people being potentially included. She suggested that the definition in

the legislation could be apposite for some siblings but probably older siblings. She contended

that the scheme as a whole was convention compliant. She suggested that the test of “a

significant involvement in the upbringing of the child” could be given a fairly generous

interpretation but that the test was not the same as previously and to that extent she departed

from the primary position on behalf of the Reporter when he had indicated that it effectively

mirrored the previous position. She agreed with much of what Mr Dunlop had argued for the

Principal Reporter but could not agree that the word “upbringing” did not connote a sense of

raising the child. While it was acknowledged that the UK Supreme Court in Principal Reporter

v K had very deliberately not restricted the reading down to fathers, nonetheless the case was

not a discussion of the position of siblings and K was an unmarried father at the centre of the

[39] Finally Ms Dunlop contended that it was possible to have adequate protection without

relevant person status, the latter not being the litmus test for that protection. It was not wrong

for the legislation to adopt a calibrated approach and as the petitioner did not fall within

definition of someone with parental responsibilities and rights or even quasi-parental status it

was not controversial for him to have procedural input short of that afforded to those who do.

Seen in the round the procedural involvement which the petitioner had amounted to respect for

his family life in accordance with article 8. As damages were not sought against the third

respondent Ms Dunlop had nothing to say on that. She did not invite any reading down of the

provision at all and thought that there was a “danger of the child becoming lost” if reading

down took place. The grain of the legislation is to define carefully the status of a relevant

person and that was already comprehensive. However if the court was driven to the position of

reading words in Ms Dunlop considered it would be preferable to look at section 126 and the

applicable order (SSI 2013/193). There could be what she described as a “legislative fix” in the

sense that something could be added to the order which might offer greater clarity for the

future. Accordingly, if the court identified a clear incompatibility a By Order hearing could be

fixed at which the possibility of using such a legislative fix could be discussed.

[40] For the first interested party, the implementation authority, Ms Cartwright made a brief

submission. She did not insist in any of her pleas in law and did not align herself with any

other party’s pleas in law. Her position was that the case did not turn on the implementation

authority’s duties and fulfilment of them. The purpose of her submission was to draw attention

to the wider aspects of the local authority’s duties particularly in connection with the

preparation of reports. She drew attention to The Looked After Children (Scotland) Regulations

2009/210 (“the 2009 Regulations”) enacted under subsections 17(2) and (3) of the 1995 Act.

Those made provision for information gathering, assessment and the creation of the child’s

plan. Regulation 3 makes provision for information to be obtained by the local authority in

respect of a child to be or being looked after by them. The first interested party had lodged an

affidavit to support its position (number 35 of process). The terms of that affidavit, sworn by

the senior social work practitioner, made clear that ABC’s views had been sought before any

recommendation was made by the implementation authority to the Children’s Hearing. The

council had fulfilled all of its reporting duties when the Children’s Hearing had been called.

The broader aspects of the decision making process were not really under challenge. The local

authority had complied with all of its statutory duties, in particular that of securing ABC’s

[41] For the second interested party, Mr Aitken aligned himself with the petitioner’s position

and submitted that the current legislation is defective in relation to participation in the

Children’s Hearing by those who are not parents. He contended that it is not simply the terms

of section 81(3) and section 126 of the Act that are defective but the scheme itself. First,

however, he addressed the issue of whether his client, ABC’s father, could somehow represent

ABC’s interests either at the Children’s Hearing or on appeal from decisions of the Children’s

Hearing. He submitted that as ABC clearly has legal capacity his parents cannot act for him

absent his consent. Section 15(5) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 makes this clear. A

“transaction” is defined in section 9 of the Age of Legal Capacity Act 1991 and includes the

bringing or defending of civil proceedings. Accordingly, ABC’s parents could no longer

exercise parental responsibilities and rights so far as proceedings for him were concerned. It

had appeared from the notes of argument of the first and third respondents that they would

contend that the position was otherwise although that had not been developed in argument.

[42] Mr Aitken made four succinct and helpful points in relation to the principal argument

for determination in this case. First, he addressed the issue of the meaning of “a significant

involvement in the upbringing of the child”. He noted that this test had already resulted in

three Inner House decisions and one of the Sheriff Appeal Court and advised that there were

others “in the pipeline”. While none of the previous cases addressed the specific issue of a

sibling such as ABC, it could easily be said that the test introduced by the Scottish Parliament

has been causing significant problems in practice. It was submitted that if the Reporter’s

suggestion that the provision could be given a very wide interpretation without the need for

reading down the result would be that a child’s ability to access it would be insufficient. Even if

Parliament had intended a wider interpretation that was not in fact being adhered to and in

practice a narrower, more restrictive interpretation was being placed upon it by Reporters.

Secondly, in response to the criticisms of an “all or nothing” status it was the legislation that

created this for relevant persons, save for one ineffective attempt in section 126 for a provision

in relation to contact, Mr Aitken submitted that if a child was not told about a Children’s

Hearing that was to take place in relation to his siblings with whom he had established family

life and was not given the right to participate, the legislation did not give adequate protection to

his article 8 ECHR right. Counsel stressed that an invitation to attend was insufficient because

the participatory right included the making of representations, access to papers, being informed

formally of a decision and a right to appeal. Thirdly, while the “halfway house” of section 126

went some way to provide for involvement without full relevant person status for those who

may not want it the provision did not ultimately succeed in achieving that. The conditions of

section 126 require to be engaged and these include that there has to be a CSO in place and the

Children’s Hearing has made a contact direction. Accordingly, section 126 cannot be relied on

if contact is the important issue but no direction has been made. Further, it is engaged only for

those who either have a contact order, which would be unusual for siblings, or where there is a

permanence order or where someone claims that they satisfy the “significant involvement in the

upbringing of the child” test which of course would allow them to be included as a relevant

person. As ABC has no contact order and cannot satisfy the relevant person test section 126

does not cure his particular difficulty. So far as the argument that allowing full participation by

siblings such as ABC would entitle them to documents which might be inappropriate or

upsetting, Mr Aitken pointed out that it was easy to consider examples of reports whose release

to a wider group might be problematic. However, as section 178 of the 2011 Act allows the

Reporter to withhold reports from the subject child but not from a relevant person, the

legislation already anticipates that anyone falling within the definition of relevant person will

[43] Fourthly and finally, Mr Aitken discussed the time frame in which the provisions of

section 79-81 operate. Section 81 applies where there is a reference to a pre-hearing panel in

terms of section 79(2)(a) and so when a Children’s Hearing has already been fixed. After that

short window, the opportunity for a pre-hearing panel is closed again until a subsequent

Children’s Hearing is pending. Someone in ABC’s position cannot trigger the holding of a

Children’s Hearing and the Reporter can only do so for limited purposes. This was important

because rule 22 of the 2013 Rules provides for notification of a Children’s Hearing to someone

in ABC’s position only if it is considered that he meets the relevant person test. Accordingly, it

could be seen that seeking to be deemed a relevant person using those provisions of the

legislation was not a remedy in the way suggested by senior counsel for the Reporter. One of

the difficulties that the current legislation has introduced is that, where previously a person

who could bring himself within the definition of relevant person if he met the statutory criteria

as read down by the UK Supreme Court was automatically included with full participatory

rights, the 2011 Act requires him to apply to be regarded as such. The introduction of that

requirement to apply to be a deemed relevant person against the background of the narrower

test resulted in ECHR incompatibility, all as outlined by senior counsel for the petitioner.

[44] Ms Gilchrist for the third interested party, ABC’s mother, confirmed that she was wholly

supportive of the petitioner’s position. She sought to clarify that while ABC had instructed

legal representation from about March 2016 that had been in relation to him being a subject

child before the Children’s Hearing. Secondly, in relation to her own note of argument which

indicated that her client had a concern about ABC seeing some of the material before the

Children’s Hearing, the third interested party did not object to ABC participating fully

including viewing all reports and material. Her concern was simply he might become

distressed in relation to some aspects of it but she did not object. Thirdly, she sought to align

[45] Ms Brabender made a number of points in reply. In relation to the submission made on

behalf the implementation authority, she pointed out that the affidavit number 35 of process in

particular paragraphs 14 and 15, made clear that contact with other siblings of ABC and DEF

took place but made no specific mention of ABC at all. It was Ms Brabender’s information that

there had been no involvement by the relevant social worker with ABC prior to

September 2017. Paragraph 16 of that affidavit makes clear that the social worker had no direct

contact with ABC at any stage and so there could have been no assessment by the

[46] Ms Brabender contended that reading down section 81 of the 2011 Act in the manner

suggested by Mr Dunlop was not an answer to the incompatibility of section 200 and its

definition of relevant persons because only if ABC would be able to use section 81 procedure

would that be possible. She submitted that the failure had been that of the Principal Reporter to

acknowledge that ABC may be a relevant person. Rules 22 – 24 of the 2013 Rules imposed

duties on the Reporter as a gatekeeper and required him to notify any individual who has or

recently has had significant involvement in the upbringing of the child. The Reporter’s failure

to do that was a breach if he contended that ABC could fall within that definition. The analogy

was that the Reporter had failed to tell ABC that a race was about to be run and that he (the

Reporter) was the one who could fire the starting pistol. So far as the third respondent’s

position was concerned it appeared to be an acceptance that the current test in section 81

narrowed the categories of person who could be relevant persons to those who fulfilled a

parental role which conflicted directly with Principal Reporter v K. The idea that there was a fall-

back position or “halfway house” where someone could attend the Children’s Hearing and

partly contribute was something that was provided in the 1995 Act also but had not been

sufficient to remedy the perceived ECHR compatibility in Principal Reporter v K. The inability of

ABC to bring himself within the narrower definition of section 81 proposed on behalf of the

third respondent resulted in at least section 81 being incompatible for someone in ABC’s

position. The reason that a declarator that section 126 of the Act was also incompatible was

because that section had to be read in conjunction with rule 81 of the 2013 Rules. Ms Brabender

also submitted that the third respondent’s suggestion of putting the case out By Order so that a

“legislative fix” could be contemplated if there is a problem with the legislation would do

nothing to assist ABC, whose petition had to be dealt with on its terms. She was not however

opposed to a By Order hearing to consider the matter of reading down the legislation generally

[47] The creation and operation of the Children’s Hearing system is something of which this

jurisdiction is justifiably proud. There is no suggestion in these proceedings that the Children’s

Hearing continues to be anything other than an eminently appropriate forum for consideration

of compulsory supervision measures (now orders) that may be required to secure the welfare of

children who have need of those. For many years, however, there have been challenges to the

restricted participation or lack of ability to participate in the Children’s Hearing by those who

claim that they have an interest or a right to do so. The current petition represents such a

challenge and is accordingly not concerned with the merits of any of the decisions made by the

Children’s Hearing in this case. The nature of the Children’s Hearing is that, as a bespoke

tribunal, it differs from a court in that it is not in any sense public and the environment is

intended to be less formal and facilitative of open discussion about the subject child’s particular

needs, albeit that its procedure requires to be ECHR compliant. While this case is the first to

challenge the particular definition placed on relevant persons or deemed relevant persons

under the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 there have been several cases involving the

way in which the test under discussion in this case should be applied by the pre-hearing panel.

The three Inner House decisions referred to in argument are in that category. The novel feature

of this case is that a direct challenge to the ECHR compatibility of the test for relevant person

[48] As senior counsel for the petitioner pointed out, the challenges to restrictions on

participation in the Children’s Hearing stretch back well over two decades and have included

both domestic challenges and cases in Strasbourg. The culmination of that tract of authority in

domestic law is the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Principal Reporter v K 2011 (UKSC) 91.

While that decision involved a father without parental responsibilities and rights and concerned

the interpretation of the previous legislative scheme in Part II of the Children (Scotland) Act

1995, it is of direct applicability to the issues I have to determine in a number of respects. As a

decision of the highest court of the United Kingdom on a Scottish civil appeal its ratio is

indisputably directly binding on the Scottish Courts. The case represents the most recent

authority at the highest level of the relationship between article 8 ECHR and participation in the

Scottish Children’s Hearing process. Notwithstanding that the case involved a father who

contended no more than that a parent in his situation, namely one without legal rights but a

de facto relationship, ought to be included in the definition of relevant person, the court took the

opportunity, somewhat prophetically as it has turned out, to read into the previous legislation

words that would be consistent with the general statements of principle it was laying down.

Further, a number of the arguments against wider participation in the Children’s Hearing such

as the need to restrict numbers, the dissemination of material that might be inappropriate and

other perceived practical difficulties were all canvassed before the Supreme Court as reasons to

restrict participation in the Children’s Hearing in K as they were in argument before me. In my

view, that the court intended to resolve in a broader sense the arguments about participation in

Children’s Hearings for all relevant family members can be illustrated by the following

Senior counsel for the appellant’s second solution was to insert the words ‘or

appears to be a parent who has a de facto family tie with the child’ into

sec 93(2)(b)(c). This comes much closer to addressing the incompatibility which

this court has found. However it may not go far enough. Persons other than

parents may have art 8 procedural rights which require to be protected. This is

not as dramatic an extension as it may seem. It is not every aspect of family life

which attracts procedural protection. The family succession rights which were in

issue Marckx v Belgium or more recently in Pla v Andorra, are not affected by the

children’s hearing. The uncle and aunt in Jucius and Juciuviene v Lithuania would

be covered by the existing wording of sec 93(2)(a)(c), as it appears would be the

grandparents in Bronda v Italy. If all that may be at risk is informal contact with

the wider family, then the participation of each parent and the child will in most

cases afford adequate procedural protection for any art 8 rights which the child

and other family members may have. But there are cases in which the child’s

hope of reintegration in her natural family depends on maintaining the close

relationship established with a grandparent or other family members. There

would then be a procedural obligation to involve that relative in the decision

[49] As it was not disputed that the petitioner had established family life with DEF and that

the decisions of the Children’s Hearing might interfere with that family life (although the third

respondent does not accept that there was such interference) then the decision of the

UK Supreme Court that, in addition to parents and others with parental responsibilities and

rights, relevant persons should include anyone “who appears to have established family life

with the child with which the decision of a Children’s Hearing may interfere” would on the face

of it apply to someone such as ABC. The current legislation does not use those expressions but

introduces a new test for those who do not have parental rights or are not natural parents and

that is the test of having, or having recently had, “a significant involvement in the upbringing of

the child”. If that expression is not narrower than the 1995 Act definition as read down by the

UK Supreme Court and is apposite to cover someone in ABC’s position, then the petition must

fail both because ABC had a remedy that he did not exhaust and also because that remedy is

ECHR compliant. On the other hand, if the wording of the 2011 Act is not apt to cover someone

in ABC’s position and he is someone whose family life is actually at risk in the Children’s

Hearing process then the legislature may not have gone far enough to ensure the necessary

procedural protection for his article 8 rights as that is now understood in the Children’s Hearing

context. It is not a question of whether the Scottish Parliament should have used the same

words as the Supreme Court ultimately read into the 1995 Act; rather it is a question of whether

the particular expression used cannot be interpreted so as to include all those entitled to that

protection and therefore must either be read down, which failing be declared to be incompatible

with ECHR. This is because in my view the clear ratio of the relevant part of Principal Reporter v

K was that all those who could fulfil a factual test of having “established family life with which

the decisions of the Children’s Hearing may interfere” must be able to participate fully in those

[50] Having identified the central question for determination, it may be useful next to

consider the three Inner House decisions issued since the coming into force of the 2011 Act that

have a bearing, albeit indirectly, on this question. Of course, none of the parties suggested that

any of these decisions provide a binding authority on the point being raised by the petitioner in

this case. Rather, the first and third respondents relied on them in support of a proposition that

there was a close relationship between the procedural requirements of article 8 ECHR and the

statutory test for relevant person status in the 2011 Act. Mr Dunlop went so far as to suggest

that these were effectively identical, whereas Ms Dunlop accepted that the two are different. In

CF v MF & GF [2017] CSIH 44 the Inner House allowed an appeal against a decision of a sheriff

who had overturned a pre-hearing panel’s decision that the grandparents in that particular case

should not be deemed to be relevant persons. In fact the grandparents had at an earlier stage

been deemed relevant persons and allowed to participate in hearings and the issue was about a

subsequent decision deciding that they should no longer be deemed as such. There are two

passages, however, in the decision that are of relevance and authoritative so far as the issue in

this case is concerned. The first is a passage from the opinion of Lord Drummond Young (at

“… the function of the relevant person in the scheme of the legislation is of considerable

importance. A relevant person is not concerned with the child’s care in any direct sense;

this is why, in MT v Gerry the court drew a distinction between involvement in day to

day care, where the best interests of the child are paramount, and involvement in

upbringing, the underlying criterion for appointment as a relevant person. The primary

function of a relevant person is in my opinion essentially procedural: to provide an

important check on intervention by public authorities in the life of a child. In the most

typical case it can be expected that such intervention will be by members of the child’s

family, with a view to preserving the family connection and to ensuring that the

involvement of public authorities is effectively monitored by persons who have a

familial interest in the child’s upbringing. In many case preserving a connection with

grandparents or other relatives more distant than the parents may be of vital importance

Lord Drummond Young was not concerned with any challenge to the scope of the test in the

2011 Act in expressing that view and so I take the reference to “upbringing” as simply a

reference to the wording of the provision. However, the passage first clearly emphasises the

nature of the relevant person’s function as a procedural but important check on state

intervention in the life of a child and secondly gives a clear direction that “other relatives more

distant than the parents” may appropriately and necessarily fulfil the function of relevant

person. It seems to me that the passage takes care to avoid any suggestion of the kind of

hierarchy of familial relationships for inclusion as relevant persons that was put forward by

[51] The other passage in CF v MF & GF relied on by the respondents was that of

Lord Malcolm at paragraph 54. Under specific reference to the case of Principal Reporter v K, at

paragraphs 68 and 69, Lord Malcolm refers to the comment about a procedural obligation to

involve those such as grandparents in the decision making process being made “…in the

context of an ongoing close relationship, and potential interference with someone’s ‘established

family life’ with a child.” It was the absence of a current relationship between the grandparents

and the child in CF v MF & GF that ultimately resulted in the decision of the pre-hearing panel

to exclude them being a permissible one. There is no suggestion in the present case that there

was an absence of an ongoing relationship between ABC and DEF. Lord Malcolm went on to

agree with a passage from Sheriff Principal Scott in KH v Children’s Reporter (unreported)

18 August 2016 that an argument in favour of relevant person status on behalf of a grandparent

based on article 8 may be “circular”, in the sense that “…if there is a valid case under art.8, one

would expect the statutory test for relevant person status to be met.” As I have already

indicated, there was no suggestion that such a general statement somehow provided binding

authority determining the question in this case. Its importance is two-fold, however. First,

there was no suggestion that the decision in Principal Reporter v K was somehow less relevant or

not directly in point when dealing with a case under the 2011 Act, albeit that the context of the

statements in the judgment of the UK Supreme Court required to be considered. Secondly, the

reference to the relationship between article 8 and the statutory test in the 2011 Act was made

not in the context of a challenge to the article 8 ECHR compatibility of the legislation but against

a background of there being no dispute that grandparents were capable of being included

[52] The other Inner House cases referred to (MT v Gerry [2014] SC 359 and Stated Case by AR

(Appellant) unreported, 17 December 2015) were also directed at rather different issues than

those with which the present petition is concerned. The decision in MT v Gerry put beyond

doubt that the task of the pre-hearing panel when considering whether someone should be

deemed a relevant person under the 2011 Act was directed towards conferring standing and the

fulfilment of a factual test of involvement in the upbringing of the child as opposed to

consideration of the child’s welfare. It is noteworthy however, that Principal Reporter v K was

again referred to by the Inner House in that case in the context of a discussion about the

significance of the involvement required for the procedural protection of constituting an

individual as a relevant party in the Children’s Hearing. At paragraph 14 of the opinion of the

court it is noted that, since the adjective “significant” in that context has a lack of precision, it

requires to be construed purposively. Reference is then made to Principal Reporter v K and the

statement there (at paragraph 68) that it is not every involvement in the life of the child which

calls for such procedural protection. Again there is no suggestion that the decision in Principal

Reporter v K is somehow inapplicable or less relevant following the passing of the 2011 Act. In

the last case, Stated Case by AR, Lady Dorrian, giving the opinion of the court in a passage that is

clearly obiter accepted a submission that as a matter of fact, if a party meets the statutory test in

section 81(3) of the 2011 Act he will almost certainly have article 8 rights, and vice versa, but

that they are two separate matters. The present case, it seems to me, concerns the point at

which the two concepts can be seen so to separate. Accordingly, I reject the submission made

by senior counsel for the third respondent that the decision in Principal Reporter v K cannot be

read across to the new legislation. In my view, the whole point of the wider reading down very

deliberately crafted by the UK Supreme Court in Principal Reporter v K was that the nature of the

relationships requiring protection in this context could not and should not be restricted to a

particular category or class. It is easy to think of situations where, for example, an uncle or aunt

may have had sufficient involvement with a child such that their full participation is justified;

equally a sibling or half sibling who has not been part of the child’s core family might not be

able to fulfil the test. But the sense of the requirement identified by the Supreme Court was that

what matters is whether an actual relationship with the child is at risk in the proceedings, not

the class or category of that relationship. None of the decisions since the passing of the 2011 Act

referred to above indicate that there can or should be any departure from that inclusive

[53] So far as the reliance on the case of Boyle v United Kingdom (App No 16580/90) is

concerned, I do not consider that it really assists a determination of the issues in the present

case. Of course the right to participation in any decision making process relating to a child will

require consideration of the nature of the relationship between the applicant and the child in

question. If anything, the case of Boyle supports the petitioner’s argument that, if it is found

that the legislation fails to provide an appropriate mechanism for someone whose family life is

at risk in proceedings relating to child protection, then it is likely that any interference by the

decision maker will not be regarded as “necessary” within the meaning of article 8(2) ECHR. I

conclude that the issue of whether those other than parents should, in certain circumstances, be

permitted to participate in the Children’s Hearing system in order to satisfy the procedural

requirements of article 8 ECHR has been resolved authoritatively by the UK Supreme Court in

Principal Reporter v K. There is no tension between what the Commission decided in the case of

Boyle and what the UK Supreme Court set out at paragraph 68 of K. In my view, Principal

Reporter v K does not express a “noble aspiration” but rather a recognition of the need for the

state to be appropriately inclusive in allowing all those whose family life is at risk to participate

in the decision making process, such that the category of relationship is not the determining

[54] I turn to consider the scheme of the 2011 Act in relation to this issue. The innovation of a

pre-hearing panel system does not relate only to the issue of whether an individual should be

deemed to be a relevant person. Section 79(3) of the Act lists certain other matters that can be

referred to a pre-hearing panel including, for example, whether a relevant person in relation to

the child should be refused from attending the Children’s Hearing. The particular matter at

issue here, however, is the circumstances in which the Principal Reporter must or may refer the

question of relevant person status to such a pre-hearing panel. On a plain reading of

section 79(2) any particular individual can request the Principal Reporter to refer the matter of

whether he is a relevant person to a pre-hearing panel and the Principal Reporter will be

obliged so to refer. But the legislation and associated rules created two related difficulties for

ABC. First, as neither the Principal Reporter nor his own legal advisors considered that ABC

could fall within the definition of being an individual who had a significant involvement in the

upbringing of the child, such a referral would have been meaningless, and any argument in

support of it probably unstateable, because the pre-hearing panel applying that test could not

have afforded him that status. Secondly, where an individual is unaware that a Children’s

Hearing is to take place, Rule 22 of the 2013 rules does impose a form of “gatekeeping” role on

the Reporter. Notification of the Hearing will be restricted to those that the Reporter considers

could fall within the definition of deemed relevant person. There is an obvious circularity in

that. It is for these reasons that section 81(3) is one of the provisions suggested to be ECHR

incompatible. Section 126, read together with the relevant rules, does not assist someone in

ABC’s position as he would require to satisfy the deemed relevant person test in order to invoke

that route. It is important not to lose sight of the list of those automatically included as relevant

persons in section 200 of the Act. In broad terms, those included automatically through that

provision are those, whether parents or otherwise, who hold or have had conferred on them,

parental responsibilities and rights. Someone who seeks to be included as a relevant person but

not falling within that category can only ever be a “deemed relevant person” by invoking the

section 79-81 procedure. Senior counsel for the petitioner and counsel for the second

respondent were critical of this mechanism and the role of the Principal Reporter as gatekeeper

in it. It was pointed out that under the previous legislation as read down by the UK Supreme

Court, anyone who as a matter of fact fell within the definition of having “established family

life with which the decisions of the Children’s Hearing may interfere” would automatically be

entitled to participate fully in the Children’s Hearing with all attendant rights, obligations and

locus to appeal that flow from that. It may have been simpler to adopt the previous approach of

automatic entry for those who can fulfil a relevant person test. Having considered matters,

however, I have concluded that there is nothing inherently objectionable about separating those

who qualify for full participation in the Children’s Hearing as of right and those who assert that

they fulfil certain factual criteria with the result that they be treated in terms of participation as

in exactly the same category as those who are participating as of right. They are, as the

legislation characterises them, persons who are deemed to be relevant persons if they can

satisfy a factual test. A separate stage at which any dispute about whether they fulfil that

necessary test does not, in my view, fall foul of the procedural requirements of Article 8 ECHR.

What matters is the substance of the test. Accordingly, I do not accept the contention that

section 200 of the 2011 Act created the problem and is ECHR incompatible. It must be read with

the mechanism provided in the primary legislation for including as deemed relevant persons

those with no parental responsibilities where appropriate. While I acknowledge the challenges

that will face an individual in ABC’s position who does not know when a Hearing might take

place, to some extent that difficulty was also faced by those under the previous legislation as

read down by the courts who were still not regarded (sometimes wrongly) as fulfilling the test

and so were not invited to Hearings. Only on discovery of their exclusion did they have the

remedy of appealing to the sheriff, an appeal route available to anyone who the pre-hearing

panel has refused to regard as a deemed relevant person. As I have already indicated, it is only

if the substantive test in the chosen mechanism (section 81(3)), is not apt to cover someone in

ABC’s position and he is someone whose family life is actually at risk in the Children’s Hearing

will there be shown to be a problem with the legislation. Accordingly I turn to consider the

[55] The test in section 81(3) is whether the pre-hearing panel “considers that the individual

has (or has recently had) a significant involvement in the upbringing of the child”. That is a

factual test, not qualified by any welfare test and one which must be construed purposively

(MT v Gerry at para 14). It is clear that the test does not actually require cohabitation with the

child, or even a blood relationship, for it to be fulfilled. For example a foster carer may have

significant involvement in the upbringing of the child. Similarly, an individual who provides

day to day care for the child may have significant involvement in his or her upbringing but may

not cohabit with him. The pre-hearing panel requires to consider carefully the detailed

circumstances of each case to ascertain whether the particular involvement in the life of the

child concerned requires procedural protection by participation of the individual in question in

the Children’s Hearing as a deemed relevant person. I have reached the view that the test for

deemed relevant person status in section 81(3) is a narrower test than that carefully crafted by

the UK Supreme Court in Principal Reporter v K. The notion of “upbringing” clearly connotes a

parental, educative or training role. Those who bring up a child may well not be parents but

they will be carers or educators. Someone who has lived in a core family unit with a child and

is several years older than him may have significant involvement in his sibling’s life that cannot,

even on a strained interpretation of the word “upbringing” be characterised as such but whose

day to day family life will be interfered with by any decision that takes or keeps that sibling

away from him and/or restricts contact with him. I conclude that the inclusion of the word

“upbringing” in the statutory test, without clarification, has and will continue to have the effect

of excluding from participation in the Children’s Hearing those who would have been included

under the previous legislation as read down by the Supreme Court. In this respect, I cannot

accept the submission that the “learning from Principal Reporter v K is diffused throughout the

legislation as it now stands”, at least not in its entirety. The insertion of a new “upbringing”

requirement conflicts directly with the UK Supreme Court’s requirement for an inclusive rather

[56] The primary position for the Principal Reporter is that ABC could fall within the

definition of deemed relevant person in section 81(3) and that, while it was not for this court to

determine whether or not he did, it was not inconceivable that a pre-hearing panel would have

done so. However, the undisputed facts of this case include that the Principal Reporter (having

presumably given careful consideration to that issue in terms of Rules 22-24 of the 2013 Rules in

particular) considered that ABC did not appear to be someone falling within the definition, the

third respondent in submissions did not appear to accept that ABC was likely to fall within the

definition and ABC’s own solicitors, experienced child law practitioners, did not consider that

he could fall within the definition. That the overall effect of the current legislation represents a

narrowing of the previous approach is well exemplified by a decision of the sheriff in V v

Locality Reporter Manager Stirling 2013 Fam LR 69. That case involved a 13 year old who sought

to participate in a Children’s Hearing in respect of decisions taken about her younger sister.

The Reporter argued before the sheriff that a restrictive approach should be taken to the

decision in Principal Reporter v K, pointing out that it had involved an unmarried father and not

a sibling. The sheriff rejected that contention and found that V, the 13 year old, had established

family life with her sibling with which the decision of the Children’s Hearing might interfere

and so satisfied the test as read down by the UK Supreme Court. Particular reference was made

to the guidance provided by Lady Hale at paragraph 69 of Principal Reporter v K that, in

borderline cases, it would be safer to include than exclude. The case is of interest simply

because it illustrates that someone in ABC’s position who on the face of it would have been a

relevant person under the previous legislation as read down may have no route to be deemed a

relevant person under the current legislation because of the innovation of the requirement to be

involved in the “upbringing” of the child rather than simply having an established family life

[57] I acknowledge the concerns expressed on behalf of the Principal Reporter that there are

good reasons for restricting the number of participants in the Children’s Hearing. However,

just as that argument was insufficient to overcome the difficulties with the previous legislation,

so I regard it as insufficient to resolve the difficulty with the test in section 81(3). This case is

not about imposing rights and obligations on siblings generally. It concerns the inability of an

individual who, by concession, has established family life with his sibling to participate fully in

decisions that directly affect him. In this context, I would add that I am satisfied that the

decisions of the Children’s Hearing in the present case undoubtedly interfered with that

established family life. The de facto position in family life is that sibling contact is unlimited.

Far from conferring any right of contact on these siblings, the decisions of the Children’s

Hearing altered that, first by imposing a CSO accommodating DEF away from the family unit

and then by limiting the nature and frequency of any contact that was permitted. No issue was

taken with the merits of those decisions but on the face of it they represent an interference with

the established family life between ABC and DEF. That ABC would be involved in any re-

integration of DEF with the core family unit is self-evident given that he was returned to live in

that family unit in late July 2017. This places ABC squarely in the category of someone who has

an interest not just in maintaining contact but in decisions about whether DEF will be

[58] For these reasons, I consider that those representing ABC were correct in identifying that

he could not bring himself within the test for deemed relevant person in section 81(3) and so

could not insist that the Principal Reporter refer that matter to a pre-hearing panel. It follows

that ABC did not fail to exhaust any statutory remedies in the way contended for on behalf of

the Principal Reporter. Those representing him had identified, correctly, that he could not

invoke that statutory procedure. That said, the Principal Reporter cannot be criticised by

interpreting the statute in a manner that, absent reading down, excluded ABC from being

deemed to be a relevant person, which is the conclusion I have reached. It is not so much that

the Principal Reporter breached ABC’s article 8 ECHR rights; rather the difficulty ABC faced

arose from the way in which section 81(3) is framed. The Principal Reporter’s actions, on

hearing that ABC wished to participate in the Children’s Hearing, were not irrational or

unreasonable in the circumstances. Attempts were made to allow him some level of

participation, albeit not to the extent that he would be afforded as a deemed relevant person.

[59] How then should ABC’s situation be resolved? Declarators of incompatibility of certain

provisions of the 2011 Act are sought. I consider that to be both unnecessary and inappropriate.

The starting point is section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, in terms of which I require to read

and give effect to primary legislation in a way that is compatible with Convention rights. A

declarator of incompatibility can only be made in terms of section 4 of that Act if that cannot be

done. Section 200 would only be ECHR incompatible if there were no separate provisions

allowing those with Article 8 rights who do not automatically qualify a route through which

they can be afforded equivalent status. In the vast majority of cases, as senior counsel for the

Principal Reporter pointed out, there is a dovetailing of the procedural requirements of article 8

ECHR and the provisions in question. However, in the particular circumstances of an

individual such as ABC who does not profess to have been involved in the upbringing of a child

but who has nonetheless established family life/significant involvement with that child with

which the decisions of the Children’s Hearing may interfere, the legislation is not drafted in a

way that permits him to utilise the mechanism in sections 79-81 to be deemed a relevant person

in order to participate fully and have a right of appeal against those decisions, and so there is a

danger of incompatibility. I have concluded that the section 81(3) test, even if purposively

construed, is not quite sufficient as it stands to allow those such as ABC to claim a right so to

participate. ABC’s particular position is that he has attained legal capacity and his parents

cannot, therefore, formally represent his interests. Accordingly, his claim to participate in the

hearing is not one that can be subsumed within his parent’s right to complain on his behalf. In

so concluding, however, I acknowledge that there may be many cases where the parents’

involvement as relevant persons is sufficient to protect the interests of some or all of their

[60] While the Principal Reporter’s primary submission that the test in section 81(3) is broad

enough to be interpreted purposively without any reading down is attractive, for the reasons

given I have concluded that matters cannot be resolved that way, particularly given the

decisions of those involved in this case (and in others) that someone in ABC’s position cannot

properly fall within the test. I consider that the reading down proposed on behalf of the

Principal Reporter, while somewhat inelegant, would resolve the difficulty that has arisen in

this case and for any others in the particular position of ABC. That would involve reading

down section 81(3) so that it includes the words “or persons whose established family life with the

child may be interfered with by the hearing and whose rights require the procedural protection of being a

relevant person” after the words “upbringing of the child” in section 81(3). That would resolve

matters for ABC, who does not seek the form of lesser participation provided for in section 126

of the Act. Accordingly, it is unnecessary, for the disposal of this petition, to express a view on

the issues raised about the terms of that section. No other parties suggested any appropriate

wording for reading down of the legislation. However, Ms Brabender indicated that she would

not oppose a By Order hearing to resolve the matter if the decision in principle was that the

legislation required reading down. The particular reading down proposed by Mr Dunlop has

the benefit of including as deemed relevant person only those whose rights require the

procedural protection of full participation rather than any lesser right. Standing the need to

restrict participation only to those who fulfil the test, those additional words, while arguably

otiose, may serve to clarify the difference between those whose procedural protection may be

provided adequately through those already involved as relevant persons and those who require

that procedural protection in their own right. I consider that the reading down proposed on

behalf of the Principal Reporter does not “go against the grain” of the legislation because,

reading sections 200 and 80(3) together, the provisions are clearly designed to allow full

participation by all those with the requisite Article 8 rights and fall short on a point of drafting

[61] It follows from the decision that I have reached that the difficulties ABC has

encountered have arisen primarily from the unduly narrow test in section 81(3) (absent reading

down) than any actions on the part of the Reporter or the decisions of the Children’s Hearing In

order to avoid the perceived incompatibility complained of I consider it necessary to read down

the legislation. While the decisions of the Children’s Hearing were made without ABC having

an opportunity to invoke the provisions of ss79-81 of the 2011 Act, he will now be in a position

to do so. It will be for a pre-hearing panel to apply the test as read down if an application is

made. In relation to that matter, it is not for this court to conclude that ABC should have been a

deemed relevant person at the time of the hearings of September and December 2017, just that

he should have been able to apply to participate using the appropriate statutory route.

Accordingly, I cannot be satisfied at this stage that the decisions of the Children’s Hearings

were unlawful. On the precise reading down, while I am minded to adopt the wording

proposed on behalf of the Principal Reporter, I will, to reflect the importance of the matter, have

the case brought out By Order in early course, both to give those parties who chose not to

comment on the specific wording the opportunity to do so and in relation to any other orders to

be made to reflect this Opinion, including for expenses, which I will meantime reserve. Finally,

I record my gratitude to all Counsel involved for the high quality of the submissions presented

to me in this difficult case.

Scottish Court of Session Decisions